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Trends in Capital Coefficients
ONE of the findings drawn from our analysis of secular trends in the
regulated industries thus far is the disparity in behavior of output
and capital formation. We have seen, however, that the differences
in growth rates between the two evidenced a Certain regularity.
Their relative behavior suggested a systematic, progressive diver-
gence rather than capricious differences following no apparent
pattern. We may be thus encouraged in our expectation of finding
a regularity of behavior in the ratio of capital to product studied
directly.
Before proceeding to an examination of the record, we may take
cognizance of the needs of the following chapters, in which the
factors underlying capital formation are explored. In particular, we
may distinguish the forms—of possible interest here—in which the
ratio may be defined.
Principal Concepts and Their Relationships
The first of these concepts of the capital-product ratio is highly
abstract. It cannot be measured directly, and yet it represents a
relationship of interest. Consider an industry operating in long-run
equilibrium, in the sense that its output has been attuned to demand
and its stock of reproducible capital has been adjusted to output, in
the most profitable way possible, given the factor prices prevailing
and other relevant conditions. Now suppose there is an enduring
change in the volume of demand (a shift in the demand curve) to a
new and higher level which is maintained without revision. To this
change the industry will adjust by expanding its stock of capital and
its output as well, until a new equilibrium (in the sense defined
above) is attained. The ratio between the increment in the stock of
reproducible capital (net capital formation) and the increment in
output, between these two equilibria, we may term the capital
coefficient.
Thus defined, the capital coefficient is in considerable part a
technological concept. For prevailing technology will establish the
limits of its dimensions, in many cases—and in the regulated indus-
tries especially—rather narrowly. But technology will not fix its
magnitude uniquely, unless we assume that the relative prices of the
factors of production are unchanged between the two equilibrium
positions—and unchanged, strictly, in terms of efficiency units. For
many analytical purposes the latter assumption is too restrictive,
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and may accordingly be omitted. This means that the capital
coefficient, so defined, may vary over time because of: (1) techno-
logical changes; or (2) changes in relative factor costs; or (3)
discontinuities (i.e. indivisibilities) in the units of the physical capital
stock, which irresistibly limit the adjustment to equilibrium required
between two particular levels of demand. The model should be
further elaborated to permit short-run fluctuations about the en-
during levels of demand at each equilibrium. Then, in equilibrium,
allowance may be made for the maintenance of a certain "normal"
reserve capacity. Insofar as such concepts may be applied at all to
observable growth phenomena, this is the framework which appears
most pertinent for the present study. It is the ratio of concomitant
changes in capital and output between such equilibria, which we
term the capital coefficient. It is, of course, not directly observable.
The observable concepts are the actual average and marginal
C
capital-productratios. The first of these may be defined as .,where
Cisthe stock of reproducible capital and 0isthe volume of output,
both measured in constant prices. The marginal capital-product
ratio may be defined as the ratio between the change in the stock
of reproducible capital and the change in output—i.e. as
The familiar relationship between average and marginal quantities
would suggest that when the average ratio is stable, then—during
this period of stability—it is equal to the marginal ratio. Otherwise,
they would differ in the following way: (1) So long as the average
ratio is moving downward, it must remain higher than the marginal
ratio. (2) So long as the average ratio is moving upward, it must
remain lower than the marginal ratio. (3) The slower the movement
in any direction, the smaller is the difference between the two.
(4) Whenever the two ratios change direction, it is the marginal
ratio which turns first. In the present case, however, such relation-
ships would hold only approximately. For the efficiency of the capital
stock may be improved merely through replacement. Hence, the
average capital-product ratio could decline over time even in the
absence of net changes in that capital stock—i.e. while the marginal
capital-product ratio was zero.
The relationship between the observable ratios and the capital
coefficient, defined above, cannot of course be framed with exacti-
tude. But attention may be called to one possibility. The long-run
average behavior of the marginal capital-product ratio may approxi-
mate that of the capital coefficient, at least broadly. In the long
run there is an opportunity for the errors born of uncertainty, lack
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of knowledge, etc., to cancel out. And insofar as investment is made
on the basis of estimates of the most profitable level of output in the
future, we should expect that this estimated production would tend
to converge with actual production in the long run. For though
expectations may at times diverge sharply from current realizations,
business—including utilities—will not indefinitely act upon hopes or
fears which run counter to experience. Such reasoning implies that
the marginal capital-product ratio, on the average in the long run,
would resemble the capital coefficient, though we must be alert to
allow for possible exceptions. Thus, such enduring catastrophes as
the Great Depression of the 1930's and the war years of the 1940's
represent obvious occasions for substantial differences between the two.
The Data
In Chart 16 the average capital-product ratio is depicted for all
regulated industries in the aggregate from 1880—1950. Similar data
are shown for the several components in Charts 17—22. The ratios
were computed by dividing the value of plant and equipment in
1929 dollars existing at the beginning of each year by output in
1929 dollars in that same year. It should be borne in mind, however,
that the measures of output employed in this study are gross, in the
sense that no deduction is made for the quantity of goods and
services consumed by these industries which were produced elsewhere
in the economy. Thus, railroad output is measured in terms of
freight ton-miles and passenger miles, appropriately weighted and
valued at 1929 prices. No deduction from this figure is made for the
coal, oil, and other materials used by the railroads but produced
outside this industry.
Had we employed the concept of net rather than gross output, the
capital-product ratios we show would have been in general about
50 per cent higher. There would have been, however, no substantial
differences in their trends. This is shown in Table 20, which presents
the ratio of net output (national income originating) to gross output
(operating revenues) in selected years for the major divisions of the
regulated industries of interest here. It will be observed that the
ratios remain remarkably constant over the long run in every case,
despite moderate short-term fluctuations reflecting—among other
things—relative price changes as well as statistical errors. We may
conclude, therefore, that the secular behavior of gross and net
physical output is, in the case of our industries, much the same. This
means, of course, that the trends in capital-product ratios would
be about the same, whether the denominator was measured in net
or in gross terms.
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TABLE 20
Ratios of National Income Originating in Regulated Industries to Operating





Pullman and LightManu- All
and Affiliated andfactured Included
Tear ExpressBus Lines TelephonesTelegraph Power Gas Industries
1890 0.52
1902 0.66 0,75 0.46 0.66
1907 0.61 0.65 0.47 0.60
1912 0.62 0.68 0.48 0.61'
1917 0.61 0.63 0.47 0.60
1922 0.63 0.61 0.71 0.72 0.54 0.33 0.62
l927 0.67 0.59 , 0.68 0.79 0.61 0.50 0.65
1929 0.69 0.60 0.69 0.74 0.75 0.41 0.68
1932 0.62 0.51 0.61 0.62 0.66 0.39 0.61
1937 0.65 0.50 0.63 0.68 '054 0.51 0.60
1939 0.64 0.52 0.63 0.51 0.59
1946 0.68 0.54 0.68 0.54 0.63
Ratios are based on comparisons between' net income originating and operating
revenues in current dollars. The industries listed accounted, in 1929, for 91 per cent of
income originating in transportation and public utilities as defined by Kuznets in National
Income and Its Composition, 1919—1938 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941);
water traniportation and pipelines are omitted here. The data for income originating
for 1922—37 were taken from Kuznets (ibid.). The Kuznets figures, which are available
for 1919—38, were extrapolated to 1890 by use of data shown by Robert F. Martin,
National Income in the United States, 1799—1938 (National Industrial Conference Board,
1939) and extrapolated to 1946 by use of Department of Commerce' national income
data. The figures for operating revenues (or sales) were obtained from the Bureau of the
Census, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the
Federal Communications Commission, and trade sources.
The Aggregative Trend
The general trend in the average capital-product ratio of all
regulated industries, shown in Chart 16, is so pronounced that,
despite the volatility of the series, it is quite evident in the annual
data. But it is even more clearly represented in the nine-year moving
averages, and more unequivocally still in the trend lines fitted to the
data. The movement is progressively downward over the 1880—1950
span, and at an extraordinarily brisk rate.
Most striking, perhaps, is the very high level from which this
decline begins. For in the 1880's the ratio of capital to product
exceeded 12, meaning that on the average the regulated industries
possessed 12 dollars in plant and equipment for every one dollar of
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CHART16
Capital-Prod uct Ratios, All Regulated Industries, 1880—I 950
(ratios of value of plant and equipment in 1929 dollars to output in
1929 dollars)
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dollar of output, 1929 prices
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CHART17
Capital-Product Ratios, Steam Railroads, 1880—1950
(ratios of value of plant and equipment in 1929 dollars
to output in 1929 dollars)
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Capital-Product Ratios, Electric Light and Power, 1887—1 950
(ratios of value of plant and equipment in 1929 dollars to output
in 1929 dollars)
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CHART19
Capital-Product Ratios, Telephones, 1890—i 950
(ratios of value of plant and equipment in 1929 dollars
to output in 1929 dollars)
Tolol dollar investment per
dollar of output, 1929 prices
Source: Appendix Tables 1-20, K-tO.
annualoutput. This compares with average capital-product ratios
of less than one for manufacturing, and of less than two for agricul-
ture and mining in the same period.' Since the ratios for the other
industries were computed in terms of net output, the comparison
here actually understates the difference. It is also slightly understated
by the fact that in the numerator of our ratio we include only fixed
capital, while for the other segments total reproducible capital is
included; but the variation arising from this factor is for most
purposes—including this comparison—negligible.2
The subsequent decline in the average capital-product ratio for all
regulated industries is sharp, though it gradually loses momentum.
By the turn of the century it was down to about 6.5; by the 1920's,
to about 3.5; and by 1950, to 1.7. Of course the latter figure may be
abnormally low, still reflecting some of the remaining backlog of
capital requirements accumulated during the years of privation in
World War II. This is suggested, albeit very roughly, by the position
1SimonKuznets, "Capital Product Ratio and Technological Change," Conference on
Quantitative Description of Technological Change, Social Science Research Council, 1950,
Table 4.
2Inthe regulated industries, inventories typically account for less than 2 per cent of
total reproducible capital. See Chapter 8.
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CHART20
Capital-Product Ratios, Street and Electric Railways, 1890—1950
(ratios of value of plant and equipment in 1929 dollars to output in
1929dollars)
Total dollar investment per
dollar of output, 1929 prices
of the trend line, which ranges somewhat above the actual capital-
product ratio throughout the 1940's. But even if—illustratively—we
take the trend line capital-product ratio in 195,0 as more representative
of its "true" long-run value than the actual figure in that year, we
note that it is still little more than 2, or about a sixth of its size of
seventy years before.
The tendency of the absolute rate of decline in the ratio to
diminish gradually is reflected in the form of the curve fitted to the
data. Its equation is given in the footnote to the chart. It is the
declining branch of a Gompertz curve, and falls gradually toward
a fixed lower limit—the value of which in our fit is1.4. Taken
literally, this would imply that the long-run value of the average
capital-product ratio will continue to decline very gradually in the
future, approaching by ever smaller amounts the floor of 1.4. But
there is no intention here to employ the curve for a mechanical
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CHART21
Capital-Product Ratios, Local Bus Lines, 1922—1950
(ratios of value of plant and equipment in 1929. dollars
to output in 1929 dollars)
Total dollar investment per
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extrapolationof this kind. It serves as a descriptive, smoothing
device, and aids in the detection and—to some extent—the appraisal
of periods such as the 1930's and the 1940's when the ratio departed
from its general long-run drift.3
Despite the substantial decline in the capital-product ratio over the
1880—1950 span, and despite the repression of this ratio by the
special conditions of the l940's, it remained considerably above
similar ratios computed for other segments of the economy. Thus, in
manufacturing, the average capital-product ratio in 1948, computed
on the same basis as ours, was 0.65, compared with 1.7 in the
regulated industries. In mining the ratio was l.3. Accordingly, the
regulated industries remained a segment in which reproducible
capital played an extraordinarily large role in the productive
process, though the differences in this regard are very much smaller
than they were seventy years before. It should be noted, however,
that disparities in the capital-product ratios among industries
provide only a rough guide to divergences in the amount of capital
consumed for each dollar of output. In the regulated industries, capital
is on the average considerably more durable than in the economy
as a whole. In the 1930's the average depreciation rate in this segment
was 1.9 per cent compared with from 5.4 to 9.2 per cent in manu-
facturing industries, 4.9 in mining, and to 3.5 per cent in the
'These remarks apply as well to the curves fitted in Charts 17, 18, and 20. Nothing
in the mechanics of the curves themselves justifies extrapolation.
°DanielCreamer, Capital and Output Trends in Manufacturing Industries, 1880—1948
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 41, 1954), Table 8, p. 43.
Israel Borenstein, Capital and Output Trends in Mining Industries, 1870—1948 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper No. 45, 1954), Table 13, p. 54.
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CHART22
Capital-Product Ratios, All Other Utilities and Transportation, 1890—1950
(ratios of value of plant and equipment in 1929 dollars to output in 1929 dollars)
Total dollar investment per
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economy in the aggregate.6 Such discrepancies alone, other things
being equal, would result .in observed differences in capital-product
ratios at least as large as those in the 1940's, though not nearly so
large as those observed in the later decades of the nineteenth century.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the capital-product ratio
is the light it casts upon the impact of an alteration in demand upon
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investment—i.e. upon the capital coefficient. Of course no simple,
empirical ratio can measure this exactly, for the causal relationships
will typically remain, to a large extent, obscure. In practice, invest-
ment is always undertaken with future needs in mind, and may have
little relationship with current changes in output. But as noted earlier,
in the long run, business expectations are brought closer in line with
actualities, errors in one direction find compensatory counterparts
in the other, and sufficient time elapses for adjusting the stock of
capital to realized requirements as they appear. We may counten-
ance, therefore, the possibility of at least approximating the general
drift of the capital coefficient and—over sufficiently long periods—its
general magnitude. For this purpose the marginal capital-product
ratio is most pertinent.
Measuring the trend of the marginal capital-productratio,
however, presents some difficulties. Because of its highly erratic
nature, values in particular years have little or no meaning for the
purposes in view here. Values computed over a considerable span
remain peculiarly sensitive to the choice of end years—a difficulty
which is modified, but not often eliminated, by the use of broad
averages. In Table 21 we have tried to refine the measurements
TABLE 21
Marginal Capital-Product Ratio,
All Regulated Industries and Components, Selected Periods
Electric Street
All Light and Local
Regulated and Electric Bus All
Period IndustriesRailroads Power TelephonesRailwaysLinesOther
To l89l 9.2 10.2 16.9 4.6 5.9 ... 11.4
1891—1910 2.9 1.8 11.5 2.4 5.9 ... 2.4
1910—1927 1.9 2.0 3.0 1.0 —4.5 0.8 2.2
I927l950b 0.4 —0.2 0.6 2.2 4.0 0.9 0.4
These are the ratios of the change in the stock of reproducible capital between the ends of
the indicated years to the change in the nine-year averages of output, centered in the
indicated years. Both numerator and denominator are measured in 1929 dollars.
a From the starting date of the industry.
°Dataused for 1950 are for the single year only.
further by selecting end periods which are centered about the peak
years of long cycles. The numerators of the ratios therein presented
are the changes between the ends of the indicated years in the stock
of reproducible capital, measured in 1929 dollars—i.e. net capital
formation. The denominators are the changes in the nine-year
averages of output, centered on the years indicated. An exception
was made for the terminal year, since here it was desired to extend
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the period as far as possible in order to reflect the activity of the
post-war period; rather than stop with the nine-year average
centered in 1946, we terminate the change with 1950, for which
output in that year alone was employed.
The data show a sharp and progressive downward trend in the
marginal capital-product ratio. In the period prior to the 1890's,
an increase of one dollar in the output of 'the regulated industries
was accompanied on the average by an increase of 9 dollars in
capital formation. In the 1891—1910 span, an increase of one dollar
in output was accompanied by one of only 3 dollars in capital
formation, in 1910—27 by one of only 2 dollars, and in the 1927—50
span, by only a 40-cent advance in capital formation. Thus the
impact of an expansion in demand upon investment grew steadily
weaker over time. This conclusion is reinforced when we examine
the record of individual components.
Individual Industries
The trend of the average capital-product ratios in the com-
ponents is depicted in Charts 17—22. In every case but one—local bus
lines—the general long-run drift is downward, in keeping with that
of the aggregate. But there are some important distinctions to be
noted in the pace and the regularity of this movement.
Most similar to the aggregative average capital-product ratio in
the regularity and general form of its decline is that of steam railroads.
Here, the ratio dropped from about 16 in 1880 to somewhat over 6
at the turn of the century, to less than 4 in the 1920's, and finally to
about 3 in 1950. The pace of decline was progressive, proceeding by
diminishing amounts, and broken mainly by cyclical fluctuations—
especially the severe depressions of the mid-1890's and the early
1930's, when output was contracted sharply and the ratio corres-
pondingly boosted. Like the aggregative ratio, its trend is well
described throughout its range by a Gompertz curve. No one of the
other components adheres to this pattern so closely.
In electric light and power the trend is also sharply downward,
but is broken by a temporary "bottoming out" and modest rise in
the first twelve years of the twentieth century. Nor can this inter-
ruption be explained by cyclical changes in the level of business
activity. Only in the last forty years of the time span covered is the
movement of the average capital-product ratio in electric light
and power adequately described by the Gompertz curve. Never-
theless, the over-all drop in the ratio was substantial, extending from
about 15 in the early 1890's to about 10 in the 1900's, to about 4 in the
1920's, and to less than 2 in 1950.
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In Street and electric railways there is also a divergence from the
over-all pattern. From 1890 to 1910 the average capital-product ratio
in this segment rose very sharply, from slightly more than 3 to nearly
7. Thereafter, the Gompertz curve pattern isevident, and the
decline proceeds from somewhat less than 7 in 1900 to between 3
and 4 in the 1920's and to a bit more than 2 in 1950.
Although both declined over the long run, in neither telephones
nor the all other group does the average capital-product ratio
follow the Gompertz pattern. In the former, the ratio declines
sharply from about 5 in 1890 to less than 2 in the 1920's. But in the
mid-1920's the ratio began a significant rise. The advance was
powerfully accelerated in the early 1930's by the effects of the Great
Depression. However, when the influence of the depression had
subsided, and—still later—when in 1950 the influence of the wartime
squeeze on investment had been largely erased, the ratio stood at a
level slightly above its previous low point of the 1920's. In short, over
the last thirty years, taken as a whole, stability in the neighborhood
of 1.5 to 2, rather than continued decline, was characteristic of the
ratio in this component.
In the all other group the decline in the average capital-product
ratio is progressive, but not at the same evenly diminishing rate
which characterized behavior in the aggregate and in steam railroads.
From 1890 to 1906 the ratio dipped sharply, from somewhat less than
13 to a little more than 4. During the next twenty years the decline
proceeded, but very slowly, with the ratio ranging in the neighbor-
hood of 3 in the late 1920's. In the following years there was a moderate
acceleration in the pace of decline, and by 1950 the average capital-
product ratio in the all other group was slightly less than 1.
As indicated earlier, the ratio for local bus lines departs materially
from the general trend, though it must be borne in mind that the
history of this industry is very brief. The general trend of its average
capital-product ratio was upward, rising from about 0.5 in the mid-
1920's to about 1.7 in 1950. A substantial part of the increase in the
post-World War II period, however, was of short-run nature,
reflecting both the cutback in traffic from the wartime high as
private passenger cars came into wider use, and the extension of
lines into new suburban areas where the intensity of traffic was at
least initially light. Save for this brisk post-war advance in the average
capital-product ratio for local bus lines, the over-all secular upward
trend was of narrowly limited dimensions.
With the exception of this small component, however, the broad
generalization reached in connection with our study of the aggregate,
holds as well for its several parts. The over-all trend of the average
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capital-product ratio was distinctly downward over the 1880—1950
span. In the case of telephones, this decline was substantially arrested
in the last thirty years, though it was by no means reversed. In all
other components the reduction in the average capital-product ratio
has proceeded progressively for at least the past forty years and, in
twO of them, for the entirety of the seventy-year period of record.
In the same way, the generalization concerning the marginal
capital-product ratio holds for the components as well as for all
regulated industries in the aggregate. This is shown in Table 21,
where data are presented for each of the components computed by
the same method as that employed for the aggregate. But for local
bus lines, the marginal capital-product ratio moves downward in
every case. The declines are most pronounced in railroads, electric
light and power, and the all other group. In the first, the reduction
proceeds briskly from somewhat more than 10 dollars of capital
formation for every one dollar advance in output, to a long period
of stability at a level of about 2 for1 during 1891 through 1927.
Then in the final twenty-three years the ratio actually turned
negative, for in this period output was substantially increased even
though the stock of reproducible capital was reduced. In both
electric light and power and in the all other group, however, the
decline in the marginal capital-product ratio was sharp and pro-
gressive throughout the period, proceeding from nearly 17 to 0.6 in
the former and from more than 11 to 0.4 in the latter.
For telephones the reduction was much smaller. Indeed, after the
initial drop from the pre-1891 period, there was on balance but a
moderate downtrend. In street railways the reduction in the mar-
ginal ratio was also relatively modest, though it should be. remem-
bered that in this component the stock of reproducible capital had
been contracting since early in the twentieth century. During the
19 10—27 period, this contraction was accompanied by a rise in
output. During 1927—50, output also declined. The data for local bus
lines suggest virtual stability in the marginal capital-product ratio, but
here the historical base for defining the secular trend is very small.
Thus,witha minor exception,advancesinoutput were
accompanied by progressively smaller amounts of capital formation
over the 1880—1950 span—in each of the regulated industries as
well as in the aggregate. Moreover, the dimension of this change in
the long-run relationship between demand for final product and
investment was very substantial. Both the reasons for the trend, as
well asits implications, present an intriguing and challenging
problem for analysis. Some tentative explorations in this area are
included in the subject matter of Chapter 6.
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